In an October 2025 Diplomat article analyzing the ouster of then-Central Military Commission (CMC) Vice Chairman He Weidong, I argued that the fall of the other, more senior vice chairman, Zhang Youxia, would likely trigger a crisis within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
That moment has now arrived.
Not only has Zhang been purged, but PLA Chief of Staff Liu Zhenli has also fallen, with both men under investigation for “serious violations of discipline and law.” The terse official explanation set these cases apart from earlier purges, which were always framed as a fight against corruption. The fact that the Ministry of National Defense spokesperson did not even bother to invoke the usual narrative, employed to legitimize such investigations, laid bare the depth of interpersonal conflicts at the PLA’s apex, which have gone far beyond the carefully crafted anti-corruption storyline.
These shocking developments have reduced the CMC to only two members: Chairman Xi Jinping and Vice Chairman Zhang Shengmin, a career political commissar with next to no operational command experience. With the removal of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli – the last senior commanders with real combat experience who rose through the ranks mostly based on merit – the professional core of the PLA has been left gutted. Their downfall is likely going to implicate all of their associates, potentially unleashing further chaos.
The level of PLA leadership instability is unseen since the heyday of the Cultural Revolution, which necessitates an urgent question: why did Zhang and Liu fall, and what will come next?
Identifying the Causes
The PLA’s highly secretive nature complicates efforts to identify precise reasons that lead to Zhang and Liu’s downfall. It is safe to say that no one else knows the full story except a privileged few who plotted Zhang and Liu’s arrest. Nevertheless, the removal of Zhang Youxia – a childhood acquittance of Xi – seems highly unusual, given Xi’s needs for trusted individuals to occupy powerful positions and help him control the PLA, especially in a time of increasing global uncertainty.
The removal of Liu Zhenli, a decorated combat veteran known for keeping a low-profile, also makes little sense. As head of the CMC joint staff department, Liu oversees the PLA’s C4ISR capabilities – functions that are central to modern warfare and require a high degree of professional competence. Eliminating such an officer runs counter to the PLA’s institutional priorities.
In the absence of definitive information, one can utilize the process of elimination to infer possible causes that might have contributed to Zhang and Liu’s removal.
In a February 2025 article, I proposed five analytical angles for understanding PLA purges: anti-corruption, factional conflict, aging autocrat, limited military experience, and successful precedents. Corruption seems an unlikely explanation here, since it was not even cited in the official announcement. More plausibly, Xi’s actions were motivated by growing distrust due to personal conflicts, exacerbated by the insecurities of an aging leader with limited military experience, and encouraged by the success of earlier purges.
In other words, tensions between Xi, Zhang, and Liu may have escalated into an irreparable stage, leading to a total breakdown in relations. Like many aging strongmen, Xi may be growing increasingly suspicions of his surroundings – intensified by perpetual anxiousness vis-à-vis the loyalty of professional officers due to his lack of connections with this in-group. Therefore, when professional military officers voiced disagreement, it triggered further insecurity and deepened distrust.
Either way, eliminating both Zhang and Liu from their high positions represents an extraordinary development with serious ramifications down the road.
What’s Next?
Other than the question of why, another critical issue for China watchers is the broader set of ramifications and what may come next.
First and foremost, it is safe to conclude that the PLA high command is in a state of turmoil. What outsiders can observe is only a snippet of the fear and upheaval inside the PLA. The events unfolding behind the red walls of leadership compounds are certainly many times more astonishing. Negative emotions now dominate interpersonal interactions among senior officers, a dynamic that surely undermines command stability and cohesion.
Second, a pivotal question concerns the future of the CMC. As the highest national defense decision-making organ that once represented various views and interests, the CMC now consists only of two men with minimal operational military experience. It is obvious that the CMC can no longer function as intended in its current configuration.
A major question going forward would be whether Xi will govern the PLA alone or appoint replacements for Zhang and Liu, particularly when Xi has a record of not promptly refilling seats of purged CMC members. Regardless, a two-member CMC represents a severe institutional atrophy and a sharp decline in the PLA’s capacity to operate as a coherent warfighting organization.
Third, the likelihood of more infighting – and even splintering of the PLA leadership – just rose significantly with the purge of Zhang and Liu. Leadership uncertainty and deepening resentment among top military leaders could generate more pressure. These internal struggles, which are set to expand, could escalate to a point of no return, leading to even more destabilization within the PLA high command.
Finally, what does all this mean for the PLA’s ability to wage war? The purge of Liu Zhenli has clearly damaged the PLA’s operational capacity. Disorder at the top and the effective decapitation of professional leadership significantly reduced the chances of a major operation against Taiwan in the near term. But this does not mean the PLA would not initiate a very limited operation, with the intent of deterring foreign actors seeking to test PLA vulnerabilities, and to create a rally-around-the-flag effect for Xi during a period of great internal turbulence.
Conclusion
Going forward, we should expect more purges of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli’s associates at both the high and middle ranks, although such actions are unlikely to be publicized.
Also, the PLA leadership is expected be in a state of instability for most of 2026, as ongoing strife could split the elite and even contribute to open confrontations.
While we do not know the precise motivations behind the Zhang and Liu purge, they likely stem from a combination of personal conflicts, fueled by Xi’s growing insecurity associated with old age and limited military experience, and his growing confidence in using purges as a tool to consolidate power.
In any case, the events of January 24, 2026 will be remembered as a watershed moment in PLA history, with lasting consequences that rendered the CMC a collective defense decision-making organ in name only and the chief of staff position vacant, for the first time since the chaotic Cultural Revolution that profoundly disrupted the PLA.
Such volatility inevitably constraints the PLA’s warfighting capacity, making full-scale war improbable in the short term. However, very limited military operations remain possible, both as a deterrence and to generate centripetal energy within an organization at risk of falling apart from within.
