In March 2026, China’s new Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law passed during the “Two Sessions.” While the law’s enactment went largely unnoticed outside of China, it reflects Beijing’s continued emphasis on conformity in identity under a unified national framework.
This runs in direct contradiction to Taiwan’s Development of National Languages Act, enacted in July 2019, which elevated all natural languages in Taiwan as national languages and embedded linguistic diversity into public life, education, and governance. These contrasting approaches to language and identity highlight a widening divide in how each side conceptualizes nationhood – one of the many divergences that widen the political and societal gap across the Taiwan Strait.
Historically, China’s legal framework for governing ethnic minority groups has balanced the preservation of their cultural heritage (on paper, at least) while pursuing unified identity as Chinese citizens. This approach was a relic of both Leninist-style communism and imperial China’s longstanding practice of multiethnic assimilation. The 1982 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China and the 1984 Law on Regional National Autonomy formally guaranteed minority groups the right to preserve their languages and customs. Later policies, including the 2000 Law on the Standard Spoken and Written Chinese Language and the 2011 Law of the People’s Republic of China on Intangible Cultural Heritage, attempted to balance the promotion of Mandarin Chinese as a lingua franca in a country with over 300 spoken languages while preserving its minority cultures.
In practice, as is true for many of the rights codified in China’s Constitution and laws, these guarantees were never fully honored. Implementation varied widely, with particularly severe policies in Tibet and regions with Muslim majorities. Yet the laws still acknowledged that China is a multi-ethnic state.
Under Xi Jinping, however, the conception of nationhood has begun to evolve. Xi has consistently elevated and pushed the idea of zhonghua minzu gongtong ti (中华民族共同体) – a unified Chinese national community – into a central organizing principle of governance. While the original conception of zhonghua minzu, and the iterations that followed, still maintained some semblance of pluralism, its present-day interpretation is more prescriptive, with a greater emphasis on cultural compatibility, linguistic standardization, and political unity as prerequisites for “belonging and a harmonious society.”
Simply put, the new Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law continues to codify the new concept of the Chinese nation. With its provisions calling for a stronger “sense of belonging, identity, and honor,” by stressing the promotion of Mandarin-Chinese as the common spoken and written language of education and public life, it frames identity as something the state should actively shape, not as an organic or evolving phenomenon.
This push by China to create a uniform vision of national identity – one defined by “national rejuvenation” that is rooted in standardized historical narratives and the elevation of Mandarin – marks a departure from not only previous ethnic policy but Beijing’s past approaches to Taiwan. For decades, Beijing’s approach to Taiwan has rested on a degree of ambiguity. While maintaining its claim over the island, Beijing promoted economic integration and cultural exchange, suggesting that shared ancestry or cultural affinity and growing interdependence would gradually narrow political differences across the strait. Implicit in this strategy was a relatively inclusive notion of identity that could accommodate different political systems while affirming a broader sense of “Chineseness.”
Hong Kong effectively functioned as a test case to apply such an inclusive notion of identity. However, the city ended up as a cautionary tale, as Beijing demonstrated what happens when these models clash. When Beijing moved to tighten political control over Hong Kong, followed by a more assertive push to reshape civic and national identity, it invited resistance rather than deeper integration. While Beijing ultimately consolidated political control in Hong Kong, these efforts came at the cost of eroding trust and deepening local resistance to a Beijing-defined identity.
The experience with Hong Kong resulted in Beijing moving to push a more prescriptive and narrower state-crafted national identity. However, Taiwan’s diversity complicates Beijing’s strategy. Taiwan is home to 16 officially recognized Indigenous groups, with its various languages and traditions protected. Rather than simply representing a political outlier, Taiwan reflects an alternative model of identity formation – one that is pluralistic, negotiated, and shaped through civic participation rather than one curated by the Communist Party.
As Beijing continues its attempt to standardize its identity framework, Taiwan’s own sense of identity will further evolve through its democratic and civic processes. The result is a widening gap between China and Taiwan not only in political systems, but in the very meaning of nationhood and identity. Given Taiwan’s identity is more pluralistic and inclusive, Beijing’s recent shift on its policy on identity is increasingly become one that Taiwan is neither able nor willing to meet.
This tension becomes more apparent when viewed in a broader comparative context. Across the Taiwan Strait and within Chinese diaspora communities in places such as Singapore, Malaysia, and the United States, Mandarin has evolved within distinct social and political environments, coexisting with other languages and contributing to varied and locally grounded identities. Yet Beijing’s contemporary elevation of the language as a central marker of national identity reflects a shift from utility to standardization, positioning Mandarin as a tool of identity and political consolidation.
The promotion of Mandarin has served important practical functions in facilitating communication and governance across China’s vast territory. However, Beijing’s desire in cultivating a CCP-centered Chinese identity, as can be seen in the new Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law, implies that identities deviating from this standard are incomplete or in need of correction. This approach will likely undermine Beijing’s own stated long-term objective of peaceful reunification with Taiwan, as it offers less space for the Taiwanese pluralistic view of identity.
