China Power | Diplomacy | East Asia
China continues to mount a challenge to U.S. power and influence in the Caribbean Community bloc, as this grouping feels increasingly boxed in by Trump 2.0.
CARICOM’s Council for Foreign and Community Relations holds a meeting on May 8, 2025.
Credit: Flickr/ CARICOM
In the first few weeks of Donald Trump’s second term as U.S. president, with Secretary of State Marco Rubio running point, U.S.-Caribbean Community (CARICOM) relations have been in the diplomatic spotlight. Indeed, Rubio’s most recent in-person engagement with Caribbean leaders was on May 6.
By meeting with Rubio in various formats, Caribbean leaders sought to reach a meeting of the minds on the agenda for relations with the United States, hoping to also find a modus vivendi with Washington. The wider context is that Caribbean leaders are worried about Trump’s “America First Priorities.” From Washington’s vantage point, the calculus behind the current trajectory of U.S.-CARICOM relations is geopolitics. After all, the United States is mindful of the geopolitical stakes – and China’s expanding foothold in the Caribbean is just one facet.
As the contemporary China-U.S. rivalry unfolds, marked by competition “in virtually every domain of global power,” Beijing is mounting a challenge to U.S. power and influence in the CARICOM bloc. As I have assessed elsewhere, China has gained a foothold in the Caribbean, attaining significant influence through the use of economic statecraft.
Of note, the Fourth Ministerial Meeting of the China-Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) Forum took place in Beijing on May 13. The China-CELAC Forum typically takes place at three-year intervals, although the previous one was held in December 2021.
Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s address to this forum was the highlight of the one-day gathering. This speech amplifies all too familiar, Beijing-orchestrated narratives regarding the great power competition that is aiming to forge the post-unipolar moment. Xi’s speech also highlighted and pushed back on the most recent, high-profile phase of that competition: the advent of Trump’s global trade war, which has taken special aim at China. Trump’s tariffs are also negatively impacting CARICOM member states, among other countries.
Tit-for-tat tariff escalations followed Trump’s “Liberation Day” announcement on April 2. Over the weekend, China-U.S. trade talks in Geneva resulted in a significant pronouncement on a tariff rollback.
Despite that breakthrough, Xi’s speech at the China-CELAC Forum took a dig at this Trump-initiated trade spat. “There are no winners in tariff wars or trade wars. Bullying or hegemonism only leads to self-isolation,” Xi declared.
It is no surprise that Xi also used his address to focus on China’s track record of supporting regional countries’ developmental aspirations. This is part of Beijing’s latest push to increase its leadership role in the name of “unity and cooperation” – while in practice challenging Washington’s long-standing influence in the wider Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) region. It’s in that context that we should read Xi’s announcement that China “We will provide a 66 billion yuan [$9.2 billion] credit line to support LAC countries’ development.”
Clearly, the China-CELAC Forum marked a bright moment for Sino-Caribbean relations. At this particular juncture, though, the same cannot be said of U.S. relations with regional states.
Despite some gains for U.S.-CARICOM relations in the early goings of the second Trump administration, CARICOM member states have not been able to meet key aspects of their respective foreign policy objectives amid pressure from the United States. In the final analysis, the Trump administration’s associated foreign policy positioning has progressively increased the costs and stakes involved for Caribbean countries.
Washington appears to be blind to the fact that CARICOM feels increasingly boxed in by Trump’s foreign policymaking. But China knows – and continues to mount a challenge to U.S. power and influence in the bloc.
