In recent years, Beijing has adopted a calmer tone in its foreign policy, as President Xi Jinping has called on officials to build a “credible, lovable, and respectable image of China.” This transition has led many observers to conclude that China has abandoned “wolf warrior” diplomacy.
This is not entirely the case.
Rather than retreating from its well-known “wolf warrior” diplomacy, which it adopted in 2019, Beijing has differentiated its diplomatic messaging according to audience, issue, and strategic objective. In short, China did not abandon wolf warrior diplomacy but has rather become far more selective in where, when, and against whom it deploys the tactic.
The Rise of Wolf Warrior Diplomacy
China has pursued a more assertive foreign policy since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012. Xi introduced the concept of “major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics,” in which he highlighted two points: first, building a “community with a shared future for mankind”; and second, what Xi coined as the need to “dare to fight,” whereby China strives to defend its core interests and assert itself in international discourse. The 19th National Congress in 2017 mentioned “national sovereignty, security, and development interests” alongside the “core national interests,” but China has never published any official documents to more specifically identify its core interests. This leaves Beijing with room to maneuver.
Starting in 2019, Chinese foreign policy became noticeably more assertive in its language. The trend was labeled “wolf warrior diplomacy,” named after the Chinese Rambo-style action film. Zhao Lijian, the spokesperson for the Foreign Ministry and a key figure of wolf warrior diplomacy, frequently used social media to publicly criticize foreign governments. Scholars Yaoyao Dai and Luwei Rose Luqiu found a “steady and sharp increase in the hostility in diplomatic sentiment during Xi’s presidency” focused on sovereignty, terrorism, human rights, and Taiwan/One China.
For instance, in 2019 China’s ambassador to Sweden said in a radio interview that “We treat our friends with fine wine, but for our enemies we’ve got shotguns.”
In March 2020, at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, Zhao Lijian speculated on Twitter that “It might be US army who brought the epidemic to Wuhan,” fueling a conspiracy theory. “US owe us an explanation!” Zhao demanded.
During the 2021 United States-China talks in Alaska, Central Foreign Affairs Commission Director Yang Jiechi said that “the United States should not be ‘condescending’ in its tone when speaking to China, as the Chinese people never buy it.”
In 2023, Beijing warned Taiwan and its allies to stop “playing with fire.”
Since then, the headlines about jaw-dropping comments have dwindled. But Beijing did not abandon wolf warrior diplomacy; it simply became more selective about using it. China now tailors its messaging according to the strategic importance of the audience and the issue at hand.
The United States
The United States continues to face Beijing’s most assertive diplomatic rhetoric on issues that China sees as its core interests, particularly Taiwan and national security.
One example would be during U.S. President Donald Trump’s visit in May 2026. While the visit was mostly a showcase of cordiality, it did have a sharp edge. Xi Jinping described Taiwan as “the most important issue in China-U.S. relations,” warning that mishandling the issue could lead to “clashes and even conflicts” and push bilateral relations into a dangerous situation. At the same time, both governments emphasized the importance of maintaining a “stable relationship despite their differences, with discussions focusing on strategic stability, economic cooperation, and managing competition.”
On issues involving its core interests, such as Taiwan, Beijing continues to take a firm and uncompromising position. At the same time, it increasingly presents these positions alongside the language of dialogue, cooperation, and stability. This suggests that China’s position has remained the same, but the way it communicates that position has been moderate.
Europe
Even during the height of wolf warrior diplomacy, Europe was not China’s primary target. When Beijing did adopt a more confrontational tone toward European countries, it was usually in response to issues such as human rights, Taiwan, or criticism of China’s domestic policies.
China’s ambassador to France, Lu Shaye, became one of the most recognizable “wolf warrior” diplomats in Europe. In 2020, he was summoned by the French Foreign Ministry after the Chinese Embassy defended Beijing’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic while sharply criticizing France’s response. In 2021, he was summoned again over what France described as “insults and threats” following European sanctions on Chinese officials over human rights abuses in Xinjiang.
Compared with the United States, Europe has generally maintained the One China policy and has been more cautious than Washington on Taiwan-related issues. This is partly because Europe has generally maintained fewer political ties with Taiwan than the United States and has much stronger economic ties with China. Taking a stronger political stance on Taiwan or challenging the One China policy would create unnecessary tensions with Beijing.
Since 2023, Beijing increasingly reserves wolf warrior diplomacy for situations where it believes its core interests have been challenged. Since Europe is less likely to touch on these core interests, it has mostly been spared the fiery rhetoric.
This was evident during Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to Europe in 2025. Although disagreements over electric vehicle tariffs, Russia’s war in Ukraine, and market access remained, Wang repeatedly described China and Europe as “partners, not rivals” and emphasized the importance of dialogue, multilateralism, and maintaining stable economic ties.
As long as China’s core interests are not directly involved, maintaining stable relations with Europe is the higher priority.
The Global South
Since Xi Jinping introduced the idea of building a “community with a shared future for mankind,” Beijing has increasingly presented itself as a partner of developing countries. The concept reflects China’s ambition to play a larger role in global governance while portraying itself as a country that supports the development of the Global South.
One example is through the Belt and Road Initiative that Xi unveiled in 2013, which has financed infrastructure projects across Asia, Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, and parts of Europe. Through these initiatives, Beijing has sought to position itself as a leader of the developing world and reshape the world order.
Unlike its approach toward the United States, China rarely uses wolf warrior diplomacy when engaging with the Global South. Instead, Beijing presents itself as a development partner, emphasizing infrastructure investment, trade, and economic cooperation. One example was the 2024 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, where Xi announced 10 partnerships covering infrastructure, trade, healthcare, agriculture, and green development. Throughout the forum, Xi emphasized modernization, a “China-Africa community with a shared future,” and cooperation, rather than criticism or confrontation. This reflects China’s broader strategy toward the Global South: instead of using confrontational rhetoric, Beijing seeks to build long-term partnerships and expand its influence through development and economic cooperation.
Rather than abandoning wolf warrior diplomacy, China has incorporated it into a broader and more flexible diplomatic strategy. Examining when Beijing chooses to use it provides important clues both about China’s overall foreign policy and how Beijing defines its “core national interests.”
