On February 12, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) secured a landslide victory in Bangladesh’s 13th Jatiya Sangsad (Parliament) election. This was the first nationwide election following the student-led protests of July-August 2024, which forced former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to leave the country. The voting thus carried considerable significance.
For China, the election represented not only a political event but also a critical moment of observation, with implications both for political stability in Bangladesh and the future of Bangladesh-China relations.
On February 13, responding to a journalist’s question regarding Bangladesh’s general election, Lin Jian, spokesperson for China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated that China “noted that Bangladesh had a steady and smooth general election and congratulates the BNP on winning the election.” Lin also emphasized China’s willingness to work with Bangladesh to advance bilateral relations “as a traditional friend and neighbor of Bangladesh.” The remarks were subsequently republished by People’s Daily, thereby signaling consistency between diplomatic messaging and the discourse of mainstream state media.
Then Chinese Premier Li Qiang sent a congratulatory message to the newly appointed prime minister of Bangladesh, Tarique Rahman. Li described China and Bangladesh as close long-standing friends and comprehensive strategic cooperative partners. He reiterated China’s support for the new government in its smooth administration and expressed his willingness to work jointly with Rahman to raise the Bangladesh-China comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership to a new level, particularly in the context of high-quality cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and to expand exchanges and collaboration across various sectors for the benefit of the peoples of both countries.
In its own statement, China largely said that it would continued to adhere to the principle of “non-interference in internal affairs” – that is, refrain from making value judgements regarding specific political events in other countries.
Since the establishment of diplomatic relations on October 4, 1975, Bangladesh-China relations have remained broadly stable. Beijing is an important development partner of Bangladesh. Chinese enterprises have been mainly involved in the construction of roads, bridges, power facilities, and industrial parks, with much of the relevant cooperation incorporated within the framework of the BRI.
Bilateral trade experienced particularly strong growth in 2021, when the total value of imports and exports between the two countries amounted to approximately $25.15 billion. Although subsequent years have seen moderate fluctuations, the overall trade volume has remained consistently high by historical standards. In 2025, bilateral trade between China and Bangladesh totaled $24.14 billion.
In December 2024, the Padma Bridge railway link – the largest railway project in Bangladesh, which was undertaken by Chinese firms – commenced formal operations. China has also provided substantial support for the green development of Bangladesh’s construction market, sharing technology for coal-fired power stations and experience in fly ash utilization in concrete.
After more than five decades of engagement, Bangladesh-China relations have gradually developed into a mode of cooperation centered on development priorities and embedded within a broader structure of balanced diplomacy. Bangladesh has long pursued a strategy of multilateral balancing, maintaining policy maneuverability among major powers such as China, the United States, and India.
Its cooperation with China does not signify any form of alignment, but rather reflects a pragmatic choice grounded in domestic imperatives of economic transformation, infrastructure upgrading, and industrial modernization. This development-driven structure of cooperation not only accords with Bangladesh’s overarching logic of balanced diplomacy, but also constitutes the institutional foundation underpinning the long-term stability and continuity of Bangladesh-China relations.
In comparison with official statements, discussions within Chinese think tanks and academic circles regarding the Bangladeshi election place greater emphasis on structural analysis. Some studies have suggested that this election marked the entry of Bangladesh’s political order into a new phase of institutional consolidation. Given that the BNP is not an extra-systemic force but rather an integral component of the existing political structure, Chinese scholars generally assess that its government is more likely to result in policy adjustments and continuity than in a strategic rupture.
In terms of foreign policy, Liu Zongyi, director of the Center for South Asian Studies at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, has predicted that the BNP will continue to pursue a policy of balanced diplomacy. Bangladesh’s economy faces persistent foreign exchange pressures, the need for debt restructuring, and bottlenecks in industrial upgrading; its demand for infrastructure financing and manufacturing support has not diminished as a consequence of governmental change. At the same time, Bangladesh–U.S. economic and trade negotiations, adjustments in Bangladesh–India relations, and regional security issues will further shape its policy space.
Taken together, the perspectives of Chinese official statements and comments from academics reveal a clear assessment: that Bangladesh’s election has not altered the fundamental structure of bilateral relations. On the contrary, in an environment characterized by the coexistence of economic pressures and major power competition, bilateral pragmatic cooperation continues to rest upon a tangible foundation. It is widely believed that Bangladesh-China relations will retain their structural and political continuity.
