Protests erupted in Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan, in October 2020 following disputed parliamentary elections. Only four political parties out of 16 had passed the threshold for entry into parliament. Three of these had close ties to the country’s then-president, Sooronbay Jeenbekov.
Kyrgyzstan’s powerful neighbor, China, responded to the unrest with restraint – but in a way that implied democracy can cause political upheaval. Hua Chunying, spokeswoman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, said: “China sincerely hopes that all parties in Kyrgyzstan can resolve the issue according to law through dialogue and consultation, and push for stability as soon as possible.”
China adopted a different tone when Kazakhstan’s government responded violently to civil unrest in early 2022. It endorsed the Kazakh president, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, repeating his claims that “terrorists trained abroad” were responsible for the unrest. Beijing praised Tokayev’s firm response, which left hundreds of people dead.
Why did China, confronted with two uprisings in neighboring countries, react cautiously in one case and assertively in the other? As my recently published research shows, the answer points to a broader pattern in the promotion of authoritarian governance in the world today.
Researchers tend to assume that authoritarian regimes seek to export a coherent ideological model, like how the Soviet Union once promoted communism. The Soviet Union declared the aim of advancing communism abroad during the cold war, presenting one-party rule and central planning as a model for sympathetic regimes to adopt.
But few autocracies nowadays have a common ideological model to advance. Repressive regimes like the one in Beijing instead look to normalize autocratic practices elsewhere by presenting them as reasonable solutions to pressing governance challenges.
I call this “autocracy commercialization.” Just as products are marketed differently depending on the consumer, China encourages autocratic practices in different ways that are tailored to local conditions.
The Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan examples illustrate this dynamic.
Since its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Kyrgyzstan was for many years considered the most democratic country in Central Asia. It had an active political opposition, as well as a vibrant civil society and independent media outlets.
Here, Beijing has relied on what I describe in my research as a “defensive logic.” This has seen China present autocratic practices to Kyrgyzstan’s political leaders as a possible bulwark against democratic volatility. These practices have ultimately been accepted, and Kyrgyzstan has further descended toward authoritarianism.
During the unrest in 2020, Chinese officials and state media repeatedly warned that continued political turmoil could undermine Kyrgyzstan’s development. They urged all parties to resolve issues swiftly “through dialogue and consultation.” Through these claims, Beijing presented stability as the highest political good and implied that elections – and, by extension, participatory democracy – can lead to chaos.
Following the protests, the electoral authorities in Kyrgyzstan annulled the results of the elections. Jeenbekov accused “political forces” of trying to seize power illegally and subsequently resigned. He told the BBC he was ready to hand over “responsibility to strong leaders.”
A nationalist politician called Sadyr Japarov rapidly consolidated power in Kyrgyzstan after Jeenbekov’s resignation. He first declared himself acting president before being officially elected several months later in a vote criticized for lacking genuine competition.
China swiftly recognized Japarov’s government, treating it as a return to order after a period of instability. In 2024, Kyrgyzstan then put forward new laws to give more power to governing authorities and curb dissent. Media freedoms have also narrowed under Japarov’s rule and civil society space has shrunk.
Kazakhstan shows a different picture – demonstrating what I call an “affirmative logic.” When protests over fuel prices escalated into nationwide unrest in January 2022, Chinese officials aligned themselves with the government’s account of events. They emphasized terrorism and foreign interference as the root causes.
China not only fully supported Tokayev and praised his leadership. Beijing also highlighted the stabilizing roles of regional security organizations such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization, which sent troops to Kazakhstan to help tackle the protests, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Autocracy was framed affirmatively by Beijing as the guarantor of order.
Kazakhstan has subsequently continued along its authoritarian path. In April 2024, for instance, a new media law came into effect that gave the Ministry of Information powers to block accreditation of foreign media and their representatives if they are deemed to be posing a threat to national security.
These two cases show how China adapts its narratives to different contexts. This adaptability is powerful. By promoting autocracy as a flexible and context-sensitive practice, regimes such as the one in Beijing render it legitimate and, at times, preferable to any other.
Recognizing this strategy is essential for those concerned with the global clash between democracy and authoritarianism. It helps explain why autocracy persists across diverse settings and why its appeal may be broader than many people suggest.
This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article. 
