Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin do not want World War II remembered only as history. Increasingly, they want its memory to confer legitimacy on the political order they are trying to build today. The irony is difficult to miss. Two governments regularly described as revisionist powers increasingly present themselves as the rightful guardians of the international system created in 1945. Standing Together as History’s Victors In May 2025, Xi stood beside Putin in Moscow for the 80th anniversary of victory over Nazi Germany. Four months later, Putin traveled to Beijing for China’s commemoration of victory over imperial Japan. Beijing called the exchanges evidence that China and Russia were jointly defending a “correct historical perspective on World War II.” That phrase deserves attention. Xi has argued that China and the Soviet Union were the principal Asian and European theaters of the anti-fascist war and that their sacrifices gave both countries a special historical role in defending the postwar system. Writing before his Moscow visit, Xi declared that Chinese and Soviet permanent membership on the UN Security Council was “earned through blood and sacrifice.” Putin uses similar language. At Russia’s 2025 Victory Day parade, he described Russians as “heirs of the victors” charged with defending the homeland, national interests, and historical memory. Considering these deliberate phrasings, it is clear neither man is simply looking backward. Putin Turns Victory Into Continuity For Putin, the Great Patriotic War has become part of the political architecture surrounding Russia’s present-day conflicts. His government has repeatedly connected contemporary threats to Nazism, Russophobia, and the defense of the motherland. Those themes helped provide the historical vocabulary for Russia’s justification of its invasion of Ukraine, including Putin’s claim that Moscow sought to “denazify” its neighbor. The U.S. State Department has documented how the Kremlin has used World War II imagery and disputed historical claims to justify the war. Putin is also betting on it to resurrect Russian Nationalism. The Soviet victory supplies a moral inheritance. If modern Russia is the heir to the state that defeated Nazism, contemporary Russian military action can be presented as another chapter in the same defensive struggle to save and protect the motherland. He needs just enough historical continuity to make Russia’s current actions feel connected to an unquestionably righteous victory. Xi Uses History Differently Xi’s approach is less overt but potentially broader. At China’s September 2025 commemoration, Xi connected victory over Japan directly to the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” and emphasized Communist Party leadership as China moves toward that goal of regaining everything lost during the Century of Humiliation. World War II also strengthens Beijing’s contemporary diplomatic claims. Xi has described Taiwan’s postwar restoration to China as a “victorious outcome of WWII and an integral part of the postwar international order.” The historical narrative therefore does more than honor Chinese sacrifice. It connects Beijing’s position on Taiwan to the legitimacy of the settlement that followed Japan’s defeat. A Shared Claim to the Postwar Order This is where Xi and Putin increasingly converge. In May 2025, China and Russia issued a joint declaration explicitly linking the 80th anniversary of World War II victory to their commitment to safeguard the UN-centered international system and the postwar order, casting themselves as custodians. That framing turns a common Western description of China and Russia on its head. Moscow and Beijing do not present themselves as revisionists attacking the postwar system. Their argument is that they are defending its authentic version against Western distortion, hegemonism, and selective interpretation. Putin and Xi are using history as a source of jurisdiction over the present. The History Is Not Fiction There is an important limitation to this argument. China suffered enormously during the war against Japan. The Soviet Union bore catastrophic losses defeating Nazi Germany. Their contributions to Allied victory were immense, and Western narratives have sometimes understated China’s wartime experience or the scale of Soviet sacrifice. The problem begins when remembrance becomes selective political inheritance—when victory in one historical struggle is used to confer moral authority on unrelated contemporary claims. Whose Victory Is Beijing Claiming? There is an even deeper problem with Xi’s use of World War II history. The government that fought Japan was not the People’s Republic of China. The PRC did not exist until 1949. During the war, China was governed internationally and militarily by the Republic of China under Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang was commander in chief of the Chinese armed forces, and Nationalist armies bore the burden of the major conventional campaigns against Japan. That distinction matters because Beijing increasingly speaks as though the wartime sacrifices and diplomatic status of the Republic of China belong seamlessly to the Communist state that replaced it four years after Japan surrendered. Xi now invokes China’s wartime victory to reinforce Communist Party legitimacy, Beijing’s claims over Taiwan and the PRC’s status as a founding guardian of the postwar order. That is where historical remembrance begins to become political revision. The distinction is especially inconvenient for Beijing because the government descended from Chiang Kai-shek’s wartime Republic of China survives today on Taiwan. Putin uses Soviet victory to claim continuity with the state that actually fought Nazi Germany. Xi’s task is different. He is claiming the legitimacy of a wartime government his own party replaced. That may be the most revisionist part of the story.