Ottawa wants a bigger role in protecting Canadian businesses from foreign interference. But how far should the federal government be allowed to go before protecting those businesses becomes directing how they operate? That question lies at the heart of the federal government’s recently released national security strategy, which calls for closer intelligence cooperation with businesses, tighter scrutiny of foreign investment, and greater government involvement in industries considered strategically important. There are sound reasons for strengthening the relationship between government and business. Foreign interference, economic coercion, and the exploitation of commercial networks have become established features of international competition. Yet Ottawa’s approach raises questions about corporate independence, investor confidence, and Canada’s ability to compete internationally. Canada’s prosperity depends heavily on international trade and investment. In 2025, 71.7 percent of Canadian merchandise exports went to the United States, while foreign direct investment into Canada reached $96.8 billion, its highest level since 2007. These relationships underpin employment, industrial capacity, and technological development. Poorly defined government intervention could discourage new projects, affecting investment and business expansion. The government’s strategy identifies eight critical sectors, including energy, transportation, critical minerals, emerging technologies and payments, settlement, and investment. It proposes using industrial policy, investment screening, and intelligence partnerships to strengthen Canada’s economic resilience. Under the Investment Canada Act, Ottawa can review foreign investments that may threaten national security, impose conditions, block transactions, or require investors to sell their holdings. Some measures to strengthen protection against foreign interference are overdue. Canada has been slow to recognize how foreign states can exploit commercial relationships to gain strategic influence. However, greater government involvement does not necessarily produce greater economic security. Poorly defined intervention can create uncertainty and weaken the industries it is meant to protect. The nature of foreign interference has changed considerably. Intelligence collection and political influence remain important, but strategic competition increasingly extends into financial systems, supply chains, commercial partnerships, and technology development. These activities are difficult to identify because they often take place within legitimate economic structures. A commercial transaction may serve an entirely lawful purpose while also creating opportunities for foreign-state influence or strategic dependency. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service identified China, Russia, Iran, India, and Pakistan among the principal perpetrators of foreign interference and espionage against Canada in 2025. The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security has also assessed China’s cyber program as Canada’s most sophisticated and active state cyber threat. These findings demonstrate why corporate governance has become an important component of national security. Businesses control infrastructure, information, technology, and financial resources that foreign governments may seek to exploit. Nevertheless, the distinction between commercial risk and hostile activity must remain clear. Foreign ownership and international partnerships should not automatically be treated as security threats. Sound policy depends on credible intelligence, identifiable risks, and proportionate responses. Closer intelligence cooperation could provide Canadian businesses with information they would otherwise be unable to obtain. Earlier recognition of foreign interference, cyber intrusions, or economic coercion could strengthen corporate decision-making and prevent significant losses. The difficulty lies in determining where cooperation ends and government direction begins. Corporate directors must act in the corporation’s best interests, exercise independent judgment, and manage foreseeable risks. Government agencies operate under broader national security and public policy mandates. These responsibilities can complement one another, but conflicts are possible. Consider a Canadian company pursuing a commercially attractive foreign partnership. If government intelligence identifies a potential security concern, the company needs sufficient information to assess the risk. Yet the government may be unable to disclose its intelligence, leaving directors to reconcile commercial obligations with an assessment they cannot independently examine. Federal guidelines governing national security reviews acknowledge that security considerations may limit what information can be shared with investors. This is not an argument against intelligence-sharing. It illustrates why clear legal authority, confidentiality protections, and accountable decision-making are essential. Businesses must distinguish between legitimate security requirements and government preferences about how private capital should be deployed. Canada has legitimate reasons to diversify its international relationships, particularly given its dependence on the American market. However, diversification should reduce strategic vulnerabilities rather than replace one dependency with another. Commercial disagreements with democratic allies, however consequential, are not equivalent to foreign interference or economic coercion conducted by adversarial states. Treating these challenges as interchangeable risks distorting Canada’s security priorities. The objective should be to preserve access to international markets while protecting strategically important assets, technologies, and institutions. Ottawa should establish clear limits on national security intervention, supported by credible intelligence, statutory authority, and independent oversight. Intelligence-sharing arrangements must protect sensitive commercial information without displacing the responsibilities of corporate directors. The government should demonstrate that its policies produce measurable benefits, including stronger supply chains, greater investment certainty, and reduced exposure to foreign-state interference. Canada cannot afford to separate economic policy from national security. Nor can it assume that expanding government authority will automatically strengthen either. The country’s economic resilience rests on competitive businesses operating within secure, predictable institutions. Ottawa’s responsibility is to protect those conditions, not substitute government judgment for commercial decision-making. That distinction will determine whether Canada’s new approach strengthens its economic sovereignty or introduces another layer of uncertainty into an already challenging investment environment.