Last week in Washington, I sat down with Anthony D'Esposito, the inspector general at the U.S. Department of Labor. He spent his career as an NYPD detective before he served in Congress, and he approaches fraud the way a detective would: as a crime with a suspect and a trail of money, as opposed to a clerical error to be reconciled at the end of the fiscal year. He told me about a case his office has been working on. A shell company was set up to look like an online marketplace. On paper, it bought and sold goods. In practice, he said, it sent American taxpayer money back to China. It didn’t go back to some businessman in Shenzhen or Shanghai. It went to the Chinese Communist Party itself. That’s a hard thing to hear about money Congress set aside for laid-off workers. It is also not the first time we’ve heard it. In December 2022, the Secret Service said a hacking group called APT41 had stolen at least $20 million in COVID-19 relief, from unemployment benefits and Small Business Administration loans, in more than a dozen states. APT41 is based in Chengdu and has spent years running espionage operations that serve Beijing, with money-making schemes on the side. It was the first time the agency had tied pandemic fraud to hackers linked to a foreign state. One Secret Service official said it would be crazy to think the group hadn’t targeted all 50 states. Twenty million dollars is small next to the total. The Labor Department’s inspector general estimates that $76 billion in unemployment benefits went to fraudsters during the pandemic. As of Sept. 30 this year, states had recovered about $2.4 billion of it, or roughly 3 cents on the dollar. But the size of Beijing’s take was never the point. What should worry us is that it got in at all. In 2020, state unemployment offices were paying claims as fast as their systems would allow, with almost no check on who was on the other end. That didn’t only open the door to the local scammer with a stack of stolen Social Security numbers. It opened it to anyone in the world who knew where the door was, and the people who knew best were the ones who had been studying our systems for years. The cases since then fill in the picture. In May, a federal judge in Pennsylvania sentenced a 72-year-old Los Angeles man to 10 years in prison for his role in a ring that opened thousands of bank accounts in stolen names, collected unemployment payments through them, and moved the money through companies dressed up as sellers of masks and protective gear. One of his co-conspirators wired more than $35 million to the account of a company in China. Some of the fraudulent claims, according to the Labor Department, were generated by fraudsters based there. And it isn’t only Beijing. Mr. D'Esposito’s office recently released its first most-wanted list: 16 fugitives tied to about $60 million in alleged fraud. Three of them are linked to a South American criminal enterprise that, according to his office, used stolen U.S. unemployment benefits to fund gang violence. Same holes, different people walking through them. So this was never just a story about waste. This is a program that foreign regimes and foreign gangs used as a source of funding against the country that paid for it. That makes it a national security problem, and it should be handled like one. The first thing to deal with is the clock. Most federal pandemic unemployment fraud carries a five-year statute of limitations, and for some cases the deadline started running out in March 2025. Every month that passes, more of the people who stole from these programs age out of prosecution. Reps. Beth Van Duyne (R-Texas) and Tom Suozzi (D-N.Y.) introduced H.R. 8873 to extend that window to 10 years. The House passed it on June 29. It was sent to the Senate Finance Committee in July and has sat there since. Mr. D'Esposito’s point to me was simple: without the extension, every day that passes is a free pass for people who stole from the most vulnerable Americans. The Senate should take it up before the year is out. The second is the states. Unemployment insurance is run state by state, and that is where verification either happens or doesn’t. States need to know who they are paying: real identity checks, real bank-account checks, and a flag when money lands in an account that promptly forwards it overseas. When they find a pattern, they need to bring in federal investigators early rather than filing it away as an overpayment to be clawed back someday. A state agency can recover a check. It can’t indict a hacking group in Chengdu or trace a wire to a front company in China. That takes the FBI, the Secret Service, and the inspector general’s agents, and they can only work the cases they’re told about. The third is the next emergency. There will most likely be one, and there will be pressure again to get money out the door fast. But a program with no guardrails doesn’t only help the people it was built for. It also helps the people who have been waiting for exactly that kind of program, and Beijing has already shown it was paying attention last time. Mr. D'Esposito’s instinct, from his detective years, is to follow the money. In this case, the money went places Americans would never have agreed to send it. The least we can do is keep the cases open long enough to finish following the trail, and then something can actually be done to stop it.