Law has become an increasingly important arena for international competition. Over the past six years, China has introduced a series of foreign-related laws and regulations to counter foreign sanctions, intervention, and long-arm jurisdiction, collectively constituting what Chinese policy discourse calls the “three-anti” legal framework (“三反”法治体系). While Beijing’s sanctions and export controls have attracted much of the international attention over the past few years, the blocking and judicial remedy mechanisms under this framework are now also being put into practice.
The latest case came on August 19, when China’s Ministry of Justice (MOJ) invoked the newly enacted Regulations on Countering Improper Extraterritorial Jurisdiction by Foreign States (RCIEJ) against the EU’s investigation into Chinese e-commerce giant JD.com. Beijing said the EU probe sought broad and unnecessary information located in China, determined that the related cross-border investigation constituted improper extraterritorial jurisdiction, and prohibited organizations and individuals from implementing or assisting in implementing the measures concerned.
The JD.com case is only one manifestation of the legal framework’s broader application. Since May, Beijing has issued the first prohibition order under its Rules on Counteracting Unjustified Extraterritorial Application of Foreign Legislation and Other Measures (the Blocking Rules) and twice invoked the RCIEJ against the EU’s cross-border investigations. Meanwhile, Chinese companies have begun invoking Article 12 of the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law (AFSL) to seek judicial remedies, with two cases already illustrating its application and a third now pending.
After six years of development, China’s three-anti legal framework is entering a new phase of broader application, giving tangible form to its once largely hypothetical implications for cross-border business and geopolitical competition. Multinational companies increasingly find themselves caught between conflicting legal requirements, facing higher compliance costs and greater regulatory uncertainty. Sustained legal warfare could further fragment the global regulatory landscape and create new sources of friction in already strained interstate relations.
Building China’s Three-Anti Foreign-Related Rule of Law
Beijing’s three-anti legal framework is rooted in its broader efforts to strengthen “foreign-related rule of law,” an agenda that can be traced back to 2014. Amid intensifying China-U.S. rivalry, the three antis – countering foreign sanctions, interference, and long-arm jurisdiction – were explicitly identified as a key component of China’s foreign-related rule of law work in 2021.
In 2024, Beijing further incorporated the three antis into China’s foreign-related national security framework and laid out plans for their implementation. The formulation was updated in 2025, with “counter-interference” replaced by “counter-intervention.”
The legal framework began to take shape around 2020. That year, China introduced the Provisions on the Unreliable Entity List, which established a mechanism for imposing measures on designated foreign entities, and enacted its first Export Control Law to regulate the outflow of strategic resources and advanced technologies. In January 2021, Beijing followed with the Blocking Rules, designed to counter what it deemed the unjustified extraterritorial application of foreign legislation and other measures.
Five months later, Beijing further expanded this legal architecture with the AFSL, which provided a broader legal basis for imposing countermeasures against foreign actors involved in discriminatory restrictive measures targeting Chinese citizens or organizations, or in actions deemed to interfere in China’s internal affairs. Notably, Article 12 of the AFSL prohibits organizations and individuals from enforcing or assisting in the enforcement of such measures. Affected Chinese citizens and organizations may also initiate litigation in the People’s Courts, seeking an end to the infringement and compensation for losses. In March 2025, the State Council issued the Provisions on the Implementation of the AFSL, further specifying the authorities responsible for implementing countermeasures and the procedures for doing so.
The legal architecture expanded further in early 2026 with the introduction of two additional regulations. On March 31, China’s State Council issued the Regulations on Industrial and Supply Chain Security, which empower Chinese authorities to investigate and impose countermeasures against foreign actors deemed to undermine China’s industrial and supply chain security. A week later, it issued the RCIEJ, which established an integrated legal process covering the identification, announcement, blocking, and exemption of foreign measures deemed to constitute improper extraterritorial jurisdiction.
After six years of development, China’s three-anti legal framework has evolved into an increasingly comprehensive and integrated legal architecture that enables Beijing to counter foreign actions it deems to constitute sanctions, intervention, or long-arm jurisdiction.
While Beijing’s growing use of sanctions and export controls has attracted most international attention over the past few years, recent blocking measures issued by Chinese authorities and private litigation initiated by Chinese companies illustrate the growing breadth and diversity of the legal framework’s application.
Blocking the Extraterritorial Application of Foreign Legislation and Measures
Beijing has begun putting its counter-extraterritorial mechanisms into practice. On May 2, 2026, China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) issued its first prohibition order under the Blocking Rules in response to U.S. sanctions imposed on five Chinese companies over their alleged involvement in Iranian oil transactions. After determining that the U.S. sanctions constituted unjustified extraterritorial application, the MOFCOM ordered that they should not be recognized, enforced, or complied with. The state-run People’s Daily described it as a key step in moving China’s foreign-related legal toolkit from institutional development to practical application.
Less than two weeks later, Beijing invoked the newly introduced RCIEJ for the first time in response to the EU’s investigation of Nuctech, a Chinese security equipment firm, under the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR). A MOFCOM spokesperson said EU regulators had compelled Chinese banking institutions to cooperate with the investigation and demanded large amounts of unrelated information located in China. The MOJ determined that certain cross-border investigative practices constituted improper extraterritorial jurisdiction and prohibited organizations and individuals from complying with or assisting in implementing them.
More recently, the RCIEJ was invoked again in response to the EU’s FSR investigation into JD.com. As in the Nuctech case, Chinese authorities objected to cross-border requests for information and cooperation. According to Beijing, the investigation demanded broad and unnecessary information located in China, including bank accounts, ownership structures, and financing records, and sought cooperation from Chinese entities and banks. The MOJ again determined the investigation constituted unlawful extraterritorial jurisdiction and prohibited organizations or individuals from implementing or assisting in its implementation.
These three cases demonstrate that Beijing has begun applying blocking mechanisms under the three-anti legal framework to counter the extraterritorial application of foreign legislation. While these mechanisms may reduce Chinese individuals’ and entities’ exposure to such measures, they also impose countervailing legal obligations on those operating across jurisdictions, as compliance with Chinese requirements may create legal risks under foreign law.
Seeking Remedies Through Litigation in Chinese Courts
Judicial remedy provisions under the three-anti legal framework are also being applied in cross-border commercial disputes. Chinese companies are increasingly turning to the AFSL to challenge actions taken in compliance with foreign sanctions or other restrictive measures targeting them and to seek remedies through Chinese courts, including an end to the infringement and compensation for losses.
The first such lawsuit under Article 12 of the AFSL arose from a dispute between a Chinese maritime engineering company and a Swiss marine equipment firm. In June 2024, the Chinese company completed its obligations under a 2023 contract, only to be added to the U.S. Specially Designated Nationals List days later. Citing sanctions compliance, the Swiss firm suspended an outstanding $11.86 million payment. The Chinese company subsequently secured the vessel’s arrest and filed a lawsuit before the Nanjing Maritime Court later that year. The dispute ended in a court-mediated settlement, with the Chinese firm receiving full payment.
A second case went further, marking the first time a Chinese court explicitly affirmed the mandatory and overriding application of the AFSL through a judicial ruling. A Singaporean carrier refused to ship electronic products from Shanghai to Panama for a Hong Kong company after the company was placed on a foreign sanctions list. The Shanghai Maritime Court held that the carrier could not rely on foreign sanctions to justify its non-performance under Article 12 of the AFSL and ordered it to pay more than 4.99 million yuan ($739,600) in damages, plus interest.
The law is now being tested in a much larger and more complex cross-border corporate dispute. The case arose after the Dutch government intervened in Nexperia, a Dutch semiconductor company owned by Chinese tech firm Wingtech, in late 2025. On May 22, 2026, Wingtech and its subsidiary Yuching filed a lawsuit against Nexperia and five other defendants. Invoking the AFSL, they alleged that the Dutch ministerial order and related Enterprise Chamber rulings constituted discriminatory restrictive measures and sought an end to the alleged infringement and 8 billion yuan ($1.2 billion) in damages. The Dongguan Intermediate People’s Court has accepted the case, but it remains pending, potentially testing the AFSL’s application beyond sanctions-compliance disputes.
These three AFSL lawsuits demonstrate the growing use of the AFSL by Chinese companies to challenge actions taken in compliance with foreign sanctions or other restrictive measures that affect their commercial interests. Although foreign restrictive measures vary in scope and in the obligations they impose on different parties, compliance with such measures may not necessarily justify a refusal to perform contractual obligations. It may even be viewed as discriminatory treatment of Chinese counterparties, increasing litigation risks under the three-anti legal framework.
Implications for Cross-Border Business and Geopolitical Competition
China’s three-anti legal framework has moved from rapid institutional construction to broader practical application, evolving into an increasingly comprehensive and integrated legal architecture. Its constituent laws and regulations should therefore not be viewed as developing or applying in isolation. They are embedded in China’s broader legal architecture, with the same conduct potentially implicating one or more parts of the framework and other areas of Chinese law.
In the JD.com and Nuctech cases, for example, compliance with certain EU cross-border investigative measures was restricted under the RCIEJ, while providing information located in China to EU regulators could also implicate China’s data laws, including the Data Security Law and Personal Information Protection Law.
The expanding application of the anti-three legal framework creates multiple layers of exposure for multinational companies. Beijing has used sanctions and export controls against foreign actors whose conduct it considers harmful to China’s national interests, including defense companies involved in U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Such measures can restrict targeted entities’ access to Chinese-controlled items and generate commercial and broader supply chain effects.
Beijing’s recent blocking orders and AFSL lawsuits brought by Chinese companies illustrate a different type of risk. Where Chinese authorities have blocked foreign restrictive measures, actors that nevertheless comply with or assist in implementing these restrictions may face consequences under Chinese law. Possible penalties could include asset freezes, restrictions on investment or transactions, fines, and other measures. Foreign companies may also face litigation in Chinese courts if their compliance with foreign restrictive measures causes losses to targeted Chinese companies, which may seek judicial remedies to halt such conduct and obtain compensation under the three-anti legal framework.
Against this backdrop, cross-border business faces a broader challenge: commerce may remain global, but the rules governing it are increasingly nationally defined and geopolitically driven. Compliance with the requirements of one jurisdiction may create legal exposure in another. For multinational companies, cross-border compliance is thus becoming less a matter of satisfying multiple sets of rules than of navigating conflicts among them. In a deeply integrated global economy, such conflicts can reverberate through financial, commercial, and supply chain linkages, exposing banks, business partners, and other market participants well beyond the immediate targets to greater legal and regulatory uncertainty.
China is not alone in using domestic law to pursue national interests and security objectives. Beijing, for its part, portrays its three-anti legal framework as defensive, aimed at protecting the interests of the country and its people and upholding an international order based on international law through legal means. Yet the growing resort to domestic law by major powers also raises broader questions about the role of international law and the stability of the international order.
These tensions become particularly visible as geopolitical competition takes increasingly legal and regulatory forms. The contest is no longer only about which measures or countermeasures states can impose, but also about how far their rules extend and whose rules ultimately shape the conduct of individuals and entities operating across jurisdictions. Such competition risks deepening the structural tension between an interconnected global economy and increasingly nationally defined, security-driven regulatory regimes. Tit-for-tat actions could further fragment the global regulatory landscape, complicate global economic governance, and introduce additional sources of friction into already strained interstate relations.
