China, Mexico, and the United States today form an inescapable trilateral relationship in which the foreign policy of each directly impacts the interests of the other two. Over the past decade, this strategic triangle has become increasingly strained, especially since the first Donald Trump administration, whose protectionist rhetoric inaugurated a sustained cycle of distrust toward Beijing.
This dynamic deepened under Joe Biden, in parallel with the rise of China-U.S. strategic competition, placing Mexico in a particularly delicate position: between adherence to the priorities of its principal partner on the one hand, and the careful management of its relationship with China on the other.
Between Trade and Fentanyl: Washington’s Priorities
Against this backdrop, media and political attention on the China-Mexico-United States relationship has centered on two priority axes. The first reflects Washington’s interest – accentuated during Trump’s second administration – in limiting the indirect entry of Chinese products into the U.S. market, preventing Mexico from functioning as a commercial bridge for the introduction of Chinese-made inputs, goods, or components.
The second issue, even more sensitive, concerns fentanyl: a narcotic whose precursors, according to various reports, are made by companies based in China, while its processing and trafficking are carried out by Mexican cartels that subsequently move the drug into the United States.
U.S. pressure on Mexican policy toward China has intensified in light of these two fronts. President Claudia Sheinbaum’s administration has responded accordingly. Her government proposed 35 percent tariffs on Chinese products, while during the first months of her administration, authorities seized tons of fentanyl and carried out raids on irregular Chinese-origin businesses in the capital.
At the same time, Chinese investments in Mexico’s automotive sector were postponed due to Trump’s return to the White House and the potential retaliatory measures he could adopt in response to China’s growing economic presence in Mexico.
Despite this near-exclusive emphasis on trade and the fight against fentanyl, the U.S. strategy appears to have overlooked a central component of China’s projection in the hemisphere: Beijing’s ability to weave deep and durable networks with political, intellectual, and social elites in Mexico and the broader region.
This mechanism – already identified by the State Department as a security concern that has led to sanctions against Central American actors – has enabled China to advance a low-visibility but high-yield diplomacy rooted in institutional, cultural, educational, and media ties that serve its interests.
China’s Overlooked Power
In Mexico, this diplomatic style can be clearly observed across at least three fronts: systematic engagement between political elites and the International Liaison Department (ILD) of the Chinese Communist Party; agreements between national media outlets and Chinese state conglomerates; and the articulation of networks with Mexican business leaders, chambers of commerce, and universities. Each of these fronts fulfills a specific role within Beijing’s strategy: elite capture, narrative normalization, and cultural institutionalization.
The first front – political elites – is perhaps the most sophisticated. Created in 1951, the ILD operates as the CCP’s external arm responsible for relations with foreign political parties. Unlike conventional diplomatic channels, its goal is not to manage state-to-state relations but to forge ideological and personal ties with those who wield political influence in other countries.
The ILD functions as an instrument of sharp power: organizing study visits, training exchanges, party summits, and strategic dialogues designed to shape favorable perceptions of China and establish unofficial channels of communication.
In Mexico, its reach has solidified particularly with Morena, the Labor Party (PT), and allied legislators. Yeidckol Polevnsky, Alberto Anaya, Sergio Gutiérrez Luna, and other members of the Mexico-China Friendship Group have repeatedly participated in ILD and Politburo-organized programs, reaffirming their commitment to the “One China Principle” and reinforcing a relationship in which Beijing appears as a pragmatic and reliable partner.
The second front – media – constitutes one of China’s preferred instruments of sharp power. China Today, the CCP’s official magazine, is a clear example. It is not merely a journalistic product but an explicit propaganda tool designed to showcase party-state achievements in areas such as development, technology, and governance. Its agreements with Grupo Reforma and Revista Macroeconómica have enabled official CCP content to circulate as “international news” among Mexican audiences.
For its part, Canal 6 signed an agreement with China Media Group (CMG), incorporating documentaries and cultural segments produced by the Chinese state. Its director, Julio César García, has repeatedly attended party-state-organized forums such as the Chengdu Forum of Journalists and the Belt and Road Forum for Media Cooperation, reinforcing a relationship of discursive alignment.
Added to this is the willingness of newspapers such as La Jornada to publish opinion pieces signed by Chinese diplomats, including the article “Taiwan is a Province of China,” which faithfully reproduces the CCP’s official stance on Taiwanese sovereignty. Such mechanisms contribute to eroding democratic debate, discrediting the United States, and legitimizing China’s foreign policy among local audiences.
The third front – business chambers, universities, and research centers – represents the most stable institutional anchor of China’s presence in Mexico. The Mexico-China Chamber of Commerce (MEXCHAM), headed by Efrén Calvo and Víctor Cadena, has promoted the idea that the bilateral relationship is fundamentally complementary, facilitating contacts with Chinese state-owned enterprises and promoting investments in manufacturing and logistics.
In academia, CECHIMEX (UNAM) and CECHIVER (Universidad Veracruzana) function as platforms for cultural dissemination and economic analysis, but also as nodes legitimizing the party-state. Under the leadership of Aníbal Zottele, CECHIVER has systematically partnered with Chinese institutions and disseminated content aligned with official narratives on sensitive topics such as Taiwan, Xinjiang, and Tibet.
Meanwhile, Enrique Dussel Peters, at CECHIMEX, has emphasized the economic benefits of ties with China and the success of the Chinese development model, avoiding issues related to authoritarianism or human-rights violations – as reflected in a recent interview on the program Largo Aliento.
Complementing this is the presence of Confucius Institutes in public universities such as UNAM, Universidad Veracruzana, UANL, and UADY, which act as cultural arms of the Chinese state, promoting a positive image of Xi Jinping’s government while sidestepping critical debates about its political system.
A Warning for Trump
The effectiveness of these forms of influence is already visible at the subnational level. The recent inauguration of the modernization of Line 1 of the Mexico City Metro – carried out in partnership with the Chinese company CRRC and publicly celebrated by local authorities – illustrates how the networks woven between Mexican political elites and Chinese entities generate concrete outcomes.
The same is true in Veracruz, where Chinese investments in the transportation sector have been actively promoted by state authorities such as Governor Rocío Nahle and former senator Ernesto Pérez Astorga, who seek to expand cooperation with China in additional sectors.
In this context, Western actors – and particularly the United States – appear to be overlooking critical fronts of China’s advance in Mexico, including propaganda, media penetration, political socialization, and cultural institutionalization.
These mechanisms, although presented as tools of soft power, compromise U.S. security just as much as unfair trade or fentanyl trafficking, as they foster political sympathies, shape public perceptions, and reconfigure the cognitive framework through which international relations are interpreted.
