Perceptions of China are changing, if not among its neighbors – who directly face security concerns ranging from territorial and maritime issues to ongoing influence operations – at least among more distant partners, where public opinion does not perceive an immediate and direct geopolitical challenge from China. This is above all the case in Europe, for several reasons.
First, while Europe continues to discuss “de-risking” and debates, whether or not it would be realistic to “decouple” from the Chinese economy for security reasons or to prevent competition under asymmetric and unfair trade conditions, the reality of China’s export tsunami has not abated. Figures show that it may in fact even be increasing speed in early 2026. A 2025 Eurobarometer survey found that 83 percent of Europeans were in favor of diversifying trade relations, an opinion that clearly targets China since another poll by Pew found that a slim majority of Europeans now regard China as the world’s first economic power, surpassing the United States.
European public opinion is sensitive to the drama of European deindustrialization. And yet, as consumers, Europeans increasingly endorse Chinese products, given the rock-bottom prices and increasing appeal, with little regard to the issue of unfair competition. This, therefore, pits consumers’ against producers’ interest, and creates a schizophrenic public opinion. Overall, China’s year-on-year exports to the European Union have increased by 28 percent in January and February, with Italy (36 percent), France (32 percent), and Germany (31 percent) leading the march.
This schizophrenia is not unique to Europe – the same trends prevail in the United States, and the tension also exists on environmental and energy taxation issues. The strongest industrial societies – Northern Europe or Japan and South Korea – do not experience it, as they are more loyal to strong domestic brands.
This European schizophrenia is also divided along geographical lines. Opinion in Southern Europe, and generally countries where industry is not a major driving force, remain more open to China. This gives confidence to Chinese authorities that Europe cannot do without Chinese imports, much beyond its near monopoly on clean technologies. China is therefore both a powerful industrial rival and a desirable provider of attractive goods in ever expanding sectors.
Second, China’s public diplomacy has, with exceptions, been mellowing for quite some time. All stars are now aligned for a soft power push. Much media attention in Europe is focused on the tariff onslaughts of the Trump administration and its recurring rants against the European Union and many European leaders. U.S. criticism may have a point in some cases, such as Europe’s desperately slow return to a credible defense posture that hurts its case with the United States on Ukraine. But there is undoubtedly a clash in values in the open, and China’s public standing benefits from the projection of U.S. cultural wars on the European continent.
Here, of course, China presents a dual face. While it praises pragmatism and calls for compromise, it has shown no actual flexibility on the burning issues in its relations with the European Union: trade rebalancing, and its support for Russia in its war against Ukraine.
On economic flows, Europeans are clearly signaling through the planned Industrial Accelerator Act (IAA) their interest in an investment deal with China, ushering in an epochal reversal of China’s joint-venture strategy from the Deng Xiaoping era. This position is, so far, much more open than that of the U.S. administration. China’s policy response, whether at the political level or through the future behavior of its companies, is unknown at this point. But for the time being, little is changing, and one can pinpoint the strong asymmetries and the uneven level playing field that contrast with China’s praise of free market competition.
On Russia and Ukraine – which the European Union and member states such as France and Germany have repeatedly flagged as the top priority in their diplomatic interactions with Xi Jinping – it is essential to read the kind of open arm-twisting that China practices in its Track 1.5 dealing with Ukraine. It is brutal language, and if there was a need to disprove China’s professed neutrality between Russia and Ukraine, this is a smoking gun as much as its dual-use exports, energy imports, and Russia’s access to financial markets.
Third, this same bifurcating approach – verbally restrained toward the European Union as a whole, while arguing, lobbying, or applying pressure at the member state level – is well exemplified by published analyses and narratives on European affairs. It may in fact be more openly expressed than on Russia-Ukraine issues. Chinese commentaries welcome the rising theme of European strategic autonomy playing alongside tongue-in-cheek comments and, at times, biting irony regarding the obstacles facing European politics and policymaking. This brings to mind a famous quip by Charles Péguy, often attributed to Hegel regarding Immanuel Kant: “Kantianism has clean hands, but it has no hands.”
At this point, China does tread more carefully with the United States’ Western partners – in contrast to the public drubbing it has directed at Japan, a tactic that yielded a strong blowback in Japan’s February 2026 election. With the advent of war in the Middle East, China is equally careful to balance Iran with its large material stakes in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, while avoiding open antagonism with the United States. Although China’s strategic reserves and its ability to trade under the radar remain assets, a degree of dependence on Middle Eastern oil helps explain this caution.
China sells pragmatism and stability in general, but in practice it has stuck with its traditional “wait-and-see” approach – something many tend to overlook, if not forget, amid the current wave of China-related hype.
This article was originally published as the introduction to China Trends 25, the quarterly publication of the Asia Program at Institut Montaigne. Institut Montaigne is a nonprofit, independent think tank based in Paris, France.
