On February 26, ahead of the important annual Two Sessions meetings, China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) removed ten People’s Liberation Army (PLA) officers from their posts as NPC deputies. Under Chinese political conventions, this development usually indicates serious trouble for the individuals involved.
Although the NPC did not provide reasons for their removal, an analysis of these officers’ backgrounds suggest that their ouster was motivated by connections to previously purged generals. In other words, earlier purges appear to have started a domino effect within the PLA, triggering the downfall of both active and retired officers.
Given the rapid expansion of investigations, these incidents may be undercutting PLA readiness and causing greater consternation within the officer corps. It is expected that more officers will be implicated in connection with the February 26 cases in the months ahead.
Retired Admiral Shen Jinlong, who served as the commander of the PLA Navy (PLAN) from 2017 to 2021, was stripped of his NPC position alongside his political commissar, Admiral Qin Shengxiang. Shen was a career naval officer who started out as a squad leader and accumulated substantial operational experience as he rose up the ranks. Qin, by contrast, spent most of his career working at the Central Military Commission (CMC) and was later airdropped into the PLAN political commissar post in 2017. Under the leadership of Shen and Qin, the Chinese navy underwent a major expansion in both fleet size and capabilities. However, their careers coincided with the rise of Zhang Youxia as CMC vice chairman, and Zhang was abruptly purged in late January. These professional ties and personal linkages likely contributed to the removals of Shen and Qin.
Similarly, former PLA Air Force Political Commissar Yu Zhongfu – who worked as a pair with Air Force Commander Ding Laihang from 2017 to 2021 – likely fell due to these associations, given that Ding has been under corruption investigation since 2023.
General Li Qiaoming, the commander of the PLA Army, has been missing since last July’s PLA Day banquet. He was removed as an NPC deputy on February 26. Li’s journey from the commander of the Northern Theater Command to leading the PLA Army also coincided with Zhang Youxia’s rise as CMC vice chairman, which may have sealed his fate in a time of widening purges.
Like Li Qiaoming, former Information Support Force Political Commissar Li Wei has been missing since last year’s PLA Day banquet. During his tenure as political commissar of the Strategic Support Force, he served with Commander Ju Qiansheng, who had long rumored to be under investigation and was noted for repeated public disappearances and reappearances. Eventually, Ju failed to attend the PLA Day banquet and the subsequent Fourth Plenum. He has not been seen in public since.
In addition to these former chiefs of PLA services and forces, commanders of key operational units also fell in the February 26 purge. Major General Ding Laifu, the current commander of the 73rd Group Army and Major General Yang Guang, commander of PLA Rocket Force Base 64, both lost their NPC deputy titles on February 26.
The 73rd Group Army is garrisoned in Fujian Province, directly opposing Taiwan. In the event of a war, the Group Army is expected to spearhead PLA landing operations on Taiwan and make first contact with the defenders. However, prominent officers from the 73rd Group Army (formerly known as the 31st), including former CMC Vice Chairman He Weidong, Political Work Department Director Miao Hua, as well as the previous Eastern Theater Command Commander Lin Xiangyang, were all brought down in the October 2025 purge. Given these precedents, it is no surprise that Ding Laifu also encountered the same fate.
As for Yang Guang, while he currently serves as the commander of Rocket Force Base 64 in Northwest China, his last job was deputy commander of Base 61 in Fujian, which shares close links with the 73rd Group Army situated in the same province. It is therefore expected that Yang’s former colleagues in Fujian may become targets in expanded investigations.
The hunt for 73rd Group Army officers also extends to the CMC level. Major General Bian Ruifeng likely fell due to being an assistant to Miao Hua at the Political Work Department.
Another CMC-level leader, Political Commissar of the CMC National Defense Mobilization Department Wang Donghai, was probably stripped of his NPC deputy post due to his prior service with Liu Faqing, who headed the department and has been missing since the Fourth Plenum in October 2025.
Last but not the least, the fall of PLA’s Chief Judge Major General Liu Shaoyun is likely connected to the ouster of his superior – Secretary of the CMC Political and Legal Affairs Commission Wang Renhua – in December 2025. Wang’s removal appears to have disrupted the military justice system, reflected through Liu Shaoyun’s purge. Moreover, the PLA’s counterintelligence apparatus may also have encountered disturbances, given the Political and Legal Affairs Commission secretary’s oversight over this domain.
In sum, the February 26 purge witnessed the downfall of five former senior officers who once led the PLA Army, Navy, Air Force, and Information Support Force. In addition, two operational unit commanders linked to the 73rd Group Army have been purged, together with three more generals serving in CMC-level organizations.
This shows that earlier purges, particularly those in 2025 and January 2026, are now generating a cascading effect within the PLA. Insecurity among officers is likely rising and more military leaders, both active or retired, are going to be dragged into the purge. The expanding vortex is going to badly affect morale and leadership quality in frontline units, such as the 73rd Group Army across from Taiwan.
As previously forecasted, 2026 is set to be a year of instability for the PLA. Investigators are likely already targeting services, forces, and units linked to the February 26 cases, thereby fueling greater leadership upheaval and potentially undercutting the PLA’s readiness and war-preparation agenda.
