The 12th Beijing Xiangshan Forum, held from September 17-19, 2025, represented a watershed moment in China’s defense diplomacy. Under the theme “Safeguarding the International Order and Promoting Peaceful Development Together,” the forum hosted over 1,800 participants from more than 100 countries. Yet beneath the veneer of multilateral dialogue lay China’s most assertive challenge yet to the Western-led international system.
I witnessed both the 2024 and 2025 forums firsthand, and the transformation in China’s strategic messaging was unmistakable. Where last year’s proceedings maintained a cautious, diplomatic tone, this year’s forum showcased an emboldened China ready to present itself as the leader of an alternative global order.
Defense Minister Dong Jun’s 30-minute keynote – three times longer than his 10-minute address in 2024 – epitomized this strategic shift from defensive positioning to offensive alternative-building. His address, with its systematic articulation of China’s global governance vision, provides the analytical foundation for understanding Beijing’s broader strategic transformation.
A Carefully Orchestrated Strategic Trilogy
The 2025 Xiangshan Forum was the culmination of a meticulously planned strategic trilogy that began in early September. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit on September 1 served as the policy announcement platform, where President Xi Jinping unveiled the Global Governance Initiative (GGI). The September 3 Victory Day military parade provided powerful visual symbolism, with Russia’s Vladimir Putin and North Korea’s Kim Jong Un flanking Xi – a pointed message to the West about functional anti-Western solidarity without formal alliance structures.
The Xiangshan Forum, deliberately opened on September 18 to coincide with the 94th anniversary of the Manchurian Incident, completed this strategic narrative. Dong’s explicit linking of historical anti-fascist struggles to contemporary “hegemonic bullying” was no coincidence – it provided historical legitimacy for China’s current geopolitical positioning while connecting domestic and international audiences through shared historical memory.
Russian Deputy Defense Minister Anna Tsivileva’s first-session remarks reinforced this narrative, emphasizing how the Putin-Xi joint parade participation had provided “additional impetus to the strategic development of Russian-Chinese relations.” Her criticism of countries that “distort the truth about the victory in the Great Patriotic War” while praising China for “carefully preserving historical memory” demonstrated the alignment of Chinese and Russian historical narratives as a foundation for broader strategic cooperation.
The Demographic Shift: From Western Engagement to Global South Mobilization
Perhaps the most significant change was not what was said, but who was saying it. While the forum reached record attendance of 1,800 participants from over 100 countries – compared to 500 from 90 countries in 2024 – Western participation dropped dramatically. The United States downgraded its representation from assistant secretary of defense level in 2024 to defense attaché level in 2025, with most Western allies following suit.
This demographic shift was not accidental. Western nations have deliberately sought to prevent the Xiangshan Forum from achieving parity with the Singapore Shangri-La Dialogue as a high-level security forum. China reciprocated by sending Major General Hu Gangfeng, deputy president of the National Defense University, to the 2025 Shangri-La Dialogue instead of the defense minister.
The result was a forum increasingly dominated by Global South voices, providing China with the ideal audience for its alternative governance vision. The attendance composition reflected a crystallizing new Cold War structure where genuine dialogue gives way to parallel forums designed to rally respective support bases rather than bridge differences.
Five Pillars of China’s Alternative Order
China’s 2025 strategy comprised five interconnected elements, each more assertive than previous years:
1. Comprehensive Critique of U.S. Hegemony and Alliance Systems
Dong abandoned diplomatic euphemisms for direct confrontation. He repeatedly condemned “hegemonic bullying,” “jungle law,” and military strategies based on “strength, containment, and deterrence” as “inherently zero-sum” choices that “only increase hostility and ultimately backfire.” His characterization of military alliances as “small, exclusive groups serving hegemonic and selfish interests” that “create opponents and sow division” represented an unprecedented rhetorical escalation.
The critique extended beyond rhetoric to strategic fundamentals. Dong’s rejection of deterrence – the cornerstone of U.S. security strategy – as inherently destabilizing marked a direct challenge to Western strategic thinking. His warning that “obsession with absolute military superiority and the might-makes-right approach will ultimately lead to a divided world defined by chaos and jungle law” framed U.S. power projection as fundamentally illegitimate.
2. Explicit Positions on Core Security Issues
The 2025 Xiangshan Forum marked China’s most explicit public statements on Taiwan and the South China Sea. Unlike 2024’s careful avoidance of specifics, Dong declared Taiwan’s “return to China as an essential part of the post-war international order” and warned that the People’s Liberation Army “will ensure that no separatist attempt at Taiwan independence succeeds and is ready to deter external military intervention at any time.”
On the South China Sea, China dismissed “so-called freedom of navigation” advocated by “external countries” and “international arbitration” as challenges to “basic norms governing international relations.” By framing these positions as defense of post-war order and international law, China positioned potential military action not as aggression but as legitimate enforcement of globally recognized principles.
3. Strategic Reinterpretation of International Law
China’s most sophisticated maneuver involved claiming the mantle of international law defender while reinterpreting these very laws to serve its interests. Dong Jun emphasized upholding “U.N. Charter-based international order” and “widely recognized norms and principles established over the past 80 years.”
This apparent embrace of international law served three strategic purposes: legitimizing Taiwan unification as post-war order enforcement; delegitimizing U.S. actions in the South China Sea as violations of sovereignty principles; and positioning China as the “true multilateralism” defender against American “unilateralism.” By invoking absolute values like the U.N. Charter, China created a normative framework for challenging Western actions as violations of international law.
4. Institutional Completion Through the Global Governance Initiative
The Global Governance Initiative represents the capstone of China’s alternative order construction. Following the Global Development Initiative (2021), Global Security Initiative (2022), and Global Civilization Initiative (2023), the GGI provides an overarching framework unifying all previous initiatives into a comprehensive alternative to Western-led governance.
The GGI’s five core concepts – sovereign equality, rule of international law, true multilateralism, people-centered approaches, and concrete actions – offer systematic alternatives to Western governance models. Unlike previous initiatives focused on specific “deficits,” the GGI presents a comprehensive vision for global order direction, principles, and pathways.
Significantly, Xi Jinping announced the GGI at the SCO Plus meeting rather than the United Nations, signaling China’s preference for testing its governance models through controllable platforms before broader application. The SCO’s coverage of 24 percent of global territory and 42 percent of world population, with China and Russia as dominant voices, provides an ideal laboratory for alternative governance experimentation.
5. Global South Consolidation
China’s most ambitious goal involves consolidating Global South support for its alternative order. Dong’s characterization of the Global South as “an unstoppable force that drives the wheel of history forward” positioned these nations as history’s progressive agents while implicitly casting Western powers as reactionary forces.
China offered concrete inducements: enhanced “representation and voice of developing countries in international affairs,” military capacity building assistance, and comprehensive training systems for foreign military personnel. The promise to help “other militaries strengthen their capabilities to protect their legitimate rights and interests” provides rationale for extensive security assistance to Global South nations.
China also committed to expanding multilateral platforms specifically for Global South engagement, including the Xiangshan Forum itself as well as the China-Africa Peace and Security Forum, and the China-Latin America and Caribbean Defense Forum. These dedicated platforms offer alternatives to Western-dominated institutions while building China-centric networks.
Implications for South Korea and the West
This strategic transformation poses complex challenges for South Korea and Western allies. The forum’s confirmation of deepening China-Russia strategic alignment, combined with North Korea’s deployment to Ukraine, fundamentally alters Northeast Asian security dynamics. North Korea’s likely acquisition of advanced military technology and economic support in exchange for wartime participation demands multilayered responses.
The South Korea-U.S. alliance becomes more critical as North Korea’s military capabilities advance and China-Russia coordination strengthens. Enhanced extended deterrence credibility and improved technological-operational interoperability are essential. Japan-South Korea-U.S. trilateral security cooperation must evolve beyond information sharing toward substantive joint response mechanisms.
Simultaneously, South Korea should leverage China’s emphasis on “true multilateralism” and “peaceful coexistence” to highlight North Korea’s destabilizing impact on regional stability. Given China’s Global South leadership aspirations, Seoul can emphasize how North Korean provocations damage China’s “responsible great power” image.
The mutual high-level boycotts between Shangri-La Dialogue and Xiangshan Forum create unique opportunities for South Korea’s Seoul Defense Dialogue (SDD). If Seoul can attract both Chinese and American high-level participation simultaneously, the SDD could become the Asia-Pacific’s only inclusive security dialogue platform.
This requires upgrading South Korea’s Xiangshan Forum participation from current National Defense University representation to senior Defense Ministry level. Such reciprocal engagement could incentivize China to send higher-level delegations to Seoul, creating positive feedback loops that attract broader Western participation.
Success would position South Korea as a crucial intermediary in regional security governance, potentially elevating Seoul’s diplomatic value while establishing the SDD as the region’s premier security forum.
Finally, South Korea must balance practical military cooperation expansion with firm positions on core interests. China’s offer to share military education experiences and training systems provides opportunities for enhanced military exchanges, crisis management mechanisms, and humanitarian cooperation in areas like maritime search and rescue.
However, cooperation must be coupled with unwavering positions on core sovereignty issues. Chinese illegal installations in the West Sea (Yellow Sea), unauthorized fishing in South Korea’s Exclusive Economic Zone, and unilateral activities near the underwater feature of Ieodo (known as Suyan Reef in China) require firm responses grounded in the very “sovereign equality” principles China espouses.
China’s commitment to developing international rules in artificial intelligence, space, and deep-sea domains offers South Korea strategic opportunities. With substantial technological capabilities in these areas, South Korea can contribute to international rule-making processes while potentially offering third alternatives to China-U.S. regulatory competition.
Conclusion
The 2025 Xiangshan Forum marked China’s transition from reactive accommodation to proactive alternative construction. While this creates immediate security challenges through China-North Korea-Russia alignment, it also opens opportunities for countries like South Korea to leverage their unique positions as bridges between competing orders.
The key lies in maintaining alliance foundations while expanding multilateral diplomatic space, pursuing selective cooperation while upholding core principles, and positioning Seoul as an indispensable player in regional governance rather than merely choosing sides in great power competition. China’s bold gambit demands equally sophisticated responses that recognize both the challenges and opportunities of this new strategic landscape.
